AC Milan have appointed Ruben Amorim as the new head coach, replacing Massimiliano Allegri. It would be fair to say it has already divided opinion.
There has been a casting carousel at Milan, with the likes of Andoni Iraola, Mauricio Pochettino, Oliver Glasner and Matthias Jaissle all in the frame at various poins. However, earlier this week it was confirmed that Amorim has put pen to paper on a two-year deal with the option for a third.
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The Portuguese won five major trophies as manager of Sporting CP, spanning his highly successful tenure from 2020 to 2024. This includes league titles in 2020–21 and 2023–24, then a move to Manchester United followed.
In part one of our analysis, Rohit Rajeev took a look at the principles Amorim instilled at Sporting which landed him one of the biggest jobs in world football. Now, in part two, he looks at what worked and more importantly what didn’t at Old Trafford.
Rigidity exposed
One potential weakness in Amorim’s system emerges during build-up phases. With the wing backs positioned high and wide to stretch the opposition, a sudden turnover can leave significant space between the outside centre-backs and the wing-backs.
This creates an inviting channel for opponents to attack immediately in transition, particularly if they have quick wingers or forwards capable of exploiting open spaces. It is a risk that comes with Amorim’s aggressive positional structure.
While the shape helps Sporting dominate possession and progress the ball effectively, a single misplaced pass can quickly turn a controlled attack into a dangerous defensive situation.
For opponents, these moments often represent the best opportunity to hurt an otherwise well organised side.
For all the defensive solidity that a 5-2-3 shape can provide, it is not immune to problems in wide areas.
The system relies heavily on the wing backs to cover large distances both offensively and defensively, and when they are isolated in one versus one situations the structure can become vulnerable.
If a wing back lacks strong defensive qualities or struggles against direct dribblers, opponents can repeatedly target that flank and create overloads.
This issue becomes even more pronounced when the nearest wide centre-back is drawn out of position to provide support, potentially opening gaps elsewhere in the defensive line.
As a result, teams with pace and quality out wide can often find joy by attacking the channels and forcing the wing backs into difficult defensive duels.
A recurring risk in Amorim’s positional structure is what happens immediately after a turnover. Because the team commits numbers forward during possession, the rest defence can sometimes be left exposed if possession is lost in dangerous areas.
A prime example came when Noussair Mazraoui’s misplaced pass against Newcastle handed possession straight to the opposition, instantly turning United’s attacking shape into a vulnerable defensive situation.
With players positioned high up the pitch and limited cover behind the ball, Newcastle were able to attack a two versus two scenario and exploit the space before the defence could recover.
These moments highlight the fine margins within Amorim’s system, where a single mistake in possession can quickly transform territorial control into a dangerous counter attacking opportunity for the opposition.
The high press
Another vulnerability can appear within Amorim’s high pressing structure. When the front line aggressively jumps to press the opposition build up, there can sometimes be a sizeable gap between the second and third lines of the press.
If the opposition manage to bypass the initial pressure with a quick pass or intelligent movement, they can receive the ball in this pocket of space and turn to attack.
This disconnect between the pressing units can momentarily stretch the team’s compactness, allowing technically gifted opponents to progress through the middle of the pitch.
While Amorim’s pressing often succeeds in forcing mistakes high up the field, teams capable of playing through pressure can exploit these gaps and launch dangerous attacks before the defensive block has time to reorganise.
Another concern with Amorim’s approach is how his teams can struggle against elite high pressing opponents.
Both Sporting and Manchester United occasionally found it difficult to progress the ball cleanly when confronted by aggressive and well coordinated presses, particularly from sides such as Manchester City.
The build up often became too slow and predictable, allowing opponents to lock passing lanes, force rushed decisions and win possession in dangerous areas.
When the circulation lacks tempo, the numerical advantages that Amorim seeks during the first phase of build up become less effective, making it easier for the opposition to trap players near their own penalty area.
Against top pressing sides, these moments can quickly prove costly, and City repeatedly capitalised by turning high turnovers into dangerous attacking situations.
On-field issues
Amorim’s unwavering commitment to his positional principles often mirrors the kind of ideological consistency associated with coaches such as Marcelo Bielsa, where the system is trusted regardless of external pressure or game state.
However, at times this rigidity can expose a mismatch between tactical intent and the players available, particularly in high pressure defensive scenarios.
A clear example came when Manchester United were pinned deep inside their own defensive third, yet instead of opting for a direct clearance to relieve pressure, they attempted to play out through the press.
With no recognised out and out striker occupying central defensive attention, as Joshua Zirkzee often operates more as a false nine, United lacked a reliable reference point to bypass pressure.
The result was a breakdown in progression, loss of possession in a dangerous zone, and ultimately a goal conceded, highlighting how strict adherence to build up principles can become costly when game context demands pragmatism.
In this particular match, Amorim deployed Bruno Fernandes and Alejandro Garnacho as inside forwards, but their positioning highlighted a subtle tactical tension within the system.
Rather than occupying the narrow half spaces and staying close to the striker to connect play centrally, both players were often found drifting wider than the structure ideally demands, stretching the attacking unit horizontally.
As a result, the intended compactness between lines was diluted, reducing the effectiveness of central combinations and making progression through the middle more predictable.
While both Bruno Fernandes and Alejandro Garnacho are highly intelligent attackers, their natural tendencies to drift and isolate defenders in wide areas occasionally pulled them away from the zones where Amorim’s system expects inside forwards to consistently operate.
This positional mismatch limited central overloads and reduced the team’s ability to sustain pressure in the most dangerous interior spaces.
Off-field problems
Based on a report by The Athletic off field issues such as these also took place:
➤ Dan Ashworth recommended appointing a Premier League based coach rather than a system specific manager;
➤ Omar Berrada strongly backed the appointment of Ruben Amorim;
➤ Jason Wilcox had reservations about hiring a coach perceived as rigidly tied to a 3-4-2-1 structure;
➤ Amorim assured the board he would begin with a 3-4-2-1 system and later introduce tactical layers once players fully understood his methodology;
➤ Jim Ratcliffe supported Amorim’s appointment, while Ashworth eventually departed the club amid internal disagreements;
➤ The ownership backed Amorim even as he made strong squad decisions, including excluding Jadon Sancho, Marcus Rashford, Antony and Alejandro Garnacho, collectively labelled the ‘bomb squad’;
➤ Amorim reportedly requested targets such as Ollie Watkins and Emiliano Martínez, but recruitment instead delivered Benjamin Šeško and Senne Lammens;
➤ He was reportedly dissatisfied that Antoine Semenyo was not signed, while the club prioritised Bryan Mbeumo on cost grounds;
➤ Internal tension surfaced in press conferences, with Amorim criticising board-level communication and insisting he was appointed as a manager rather than a restricted head coach;
➤ Despite persuasion from Jason Wilcox to adopt a 4-2-3-1 at points, Amorim remained committed to his preferred 3-4-2-1 structure throughout.
